"One should never confuse situational awareness with knowing what is actually going on" British Officer in Iraq

 It is sheer folly to go into war, ill equipped and under strength. Sadly, our valiant troops, in Iraq, were both ill equipped and under strength until the inevitable happened. They were defeated and had to withdraw in 2008. Richard North's "Ministry of Defeat" reads like a thorough and comprehensive brief for the prosecution of both the Ministry of Defence and some politicians for their role in the unnecessary deaths of many young servicemen and women in Iraq during the period after the invasion. It is a lengthy book, which could take a little editing, but it is well researched, well written and comprehensively cross referenced, ideal for anyone who struggles to understand why Southern Iraq descended into chaos under British control. The non-military reader might want to skim read the first few lengthy chapters as they slowly build up the background to failure in Iraq in a very thorough manner, and move on to the latter chapters where the "prosecution" sets out its case.

North explains why the troops of other nations in Iraq were equipped with vehicles that provided defence against the IEDs and EFPs (Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectiles) that, although crudely manufactured, were proving so effective against the army's unprotected snatch landrover in which our troops were sent out on suicide missions. The USA provided its troops with vehicles protected against the various threats in Iraq and Afghanistan and benefited from positive leadership from Robert Gates and General Petraeus. Britain, in contrast, provided badly protected vehicle after badly protected vehicle. There was no lack of spending just a total lack of intelligent purchases. The British media had given itself over to entertainment long ago so both the MOD and Government were given an easy ride, and were allowed to control the news, spinning tale after tales of good news and of new, ill suited military toys. The contrast with the American view is stark. There General Petraus was saying

"Get accurate information of significant activities to the chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumours. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterisation, and context. Avoid spin, and let the facts speak for themselves."

 If this book represents an accurate picture of criminal incompetence, which it appears to do, with its research well referenced, then, surely, criminal proceedings against the most culpable are already overdue. From my office, I see the regular flights of C17 aircraft begin their slow respectful descent into RAF Lyneham carrying the latest cargo of coffins, the reason for their only too regular flights detailed by Richard North. However, I do not see the many soldiers repatriated without legs, blown off in poorly protected vehicles. Someone will provide those horrific figures one day as well as the death figures

 This book is much much more than just a blow by blow account of our defeat in Iraq and the lessons not learned for Afghanistan. It provides a snapshot of British leadership in the early 21^st century, a military and government leadership that seems incapable of understanding problems, for which it leaps around providing wrong solution after wrong solution, on which it wastes taxpayers money, and then refuses to accept any blame for the inevitable disasters. Where are the men and women of the past of vision, who could cut through stultifying organisations that these days seem to engulf and destroy all who enter them? Where is the system that used to promote our young visionary leaders to positions of power? North finishes with a quote from Norman Dixon's 1976 book, "On the psychology of Military Incompetence

 "Since authoritariansim is itself a product of psychological defences, authoritarian organisations are past masters at deflecting blame. They do so by denial, by rationalisation, by making scapegoats, or by some mixture of the three. However it is achieved, the net result is that no real admission of failure or incompetence is ever made by those who are really responsible; hence nothing can be done about preventing a recurrence."

 

 "Ministry of Defeat" or "The British War in Iraq 2003 - 2009", Richard North, Continuum, 2009 ISBN 9781441169976 also in the Swindon Library